University of Guelph-Humber
Course:
Ethics & Values in Business (BADM2050), Winter 2004 Semester |
| REQUIRED READINGS |
Week
3 : Finding the Norm in an Upside-Down World
Lecture Tuesday, January 20, 2004 |
Week 4: Raw Realities
and Hard Costs: Justice and the Corporation
Lecture Tuesday, January 27, 2004 |
Week
6: Corporations in the Community: Circle of Virtue, or Circle
of Vice?
Lecture Tuesday, February 10, 2004 |
Week
8: Marketplace of Values: Ethical Issues in the Workplace
Lecture Tuesday, February 24, 2004 |
Week
12: The Paradox of Arms-Length Self-Interest
Lecture Tuesday, March 23, 2004 |
Week 6: Corporations in the Community: Circle
of Virtue, or Circle of Vice?
Lecture Tuesday, February 10,
2004
Days of Reckoning, John
Wood, editor (Breakout Educational Network - Dundurn Press, 2003)
pp. 72-74
LARRY SOLOMON
Ontario Hydro was the last company to abandon nuclear power in
the Western world. The last reactors to be completed were ordered
in 1976. It took until the 1990s for those plants to be finished.
But Ontario Hydro has learned from its mistakes. It’s not
planning to build any more nuclear plants. The problem is that it
learned its mistake after accumulating a $35-billion debt. The Darlington
complex, which opened in 1990 and which was initially estimated
to cost between $3 billion and $3.5 billion, ultimately cost $15
billion. Hydro built Darlington, and cost overruns were something
in the order of $12 billion. But nobody lost his job, nobody was
demoted.
How efficient is Ontario Hydro’s use
of fuel?
IAN BAINES
Ontario Hydro operates at about 33 percent efficiency. In other
words, one-third of the uranium or coal or oil that’s used
to make the electricity actually turns into electricity. The other
two-thirds is wasted. It’s eventually dumped into the lake.
I’m sure the fish in Lake Ontario appreciate it but it doesn’t
do any economic good.
By using cogeneration, which uses natural gas instead, your efficiency
would go from 33 percent to 90 percent just like that. Natural gas
produces the least amount of greenhouse gas and carbon dioxide of
any of the fossil fuels. It doesn’t make smoke, it doesn’t
make soot, it doesn’t make sulphur dioxide. Private power
producers have to meet the 1994 environmental requirements. Ontario
Hydro doesn’t meet any of them.
None of the Hydro power-generating plants meets any of the current
regulations. When Hydro built their coal plants, there were only
minimum, if any environmental regulations. And now every year the
regulations get tougher and tougher. The only reason Hydro doesn’t
have to meet them is that it built the plants 20 or 30 years ago
and there’s no money in the pot for Hydro to go out and retrofit
these plants. Ontario Hydro is one of the largest polluters in the
province because these plants produce very large volumes of sulphurous
and nitrous oxides.
LARRY SOLOMON
If legislation like the Environmental Assessment Act (1976) comes
along and gets in Hydro’s way, Hydro lobbies for exemptions,
and because it’s so close to government, it gets those exemptions.
ELIZABETH BRUBAKER
If there’s an accident at Darlington and your property is
damaged, you can’t sue Hydro. An accident at Darlington is
covered by a law called the Nuclear Liability Act, which was passed
by the federal government in 1976 and proclaimed in 1980. If there’s
an accident with costs over $75 million dollars, Ontario Hydro is
not responsible. The act was passed because no insurance company
could take on the responsibility for a nuclear accident, which is
a pretty good sign that nuclear accidents might result in the kinds
of costs that are simply unacceptable to society.
LARRY SOLOMON
This act also states that if there is an accident at a nuclear
plant in Canada, and if that accident is caused by a faulty part
supplied by General Electric or Westinghouse or anyone else, no
matter how much damage that accident causes (and it could wipe out
the City of Toronto), GE shareholders wouldn’t have to put
up a nickel in compensation. GE has to stand behind its toaster
ovens, but it doesn’t have to stand behind its nuclear parts.
These companies realized that nuclear technology was far too dangerous
for them to stand behind their products. So they said to Hydro,
“Look, if we have to be liable for the parts we produce for
you, we’ll refuse to supply you.” And Hydro said, “Don’t
worry. We can take care of the problem.” They went to the
federal government and this law was the result.
The Nuclear Liability Act was not a contentious issue when it was
passed. Nuclear technology was not questioned by anyone. There really
were very few people to question the technology, apart form some
citizens’ groups.
Industry saw a cash cow. It had guaranteed profits. And there was
no one there to question the wisdom of removing liability for the
most dangerous technology that has ever been developed.
NOTES (p. 75-76)
1. The Energy Competition Act was passed by the
Ontario government in October 1998 to allow for competition in the
marketplace, and it went into effect in 2000. Ontario Hydro was
divided into five successor companies in 1999.
2. 1995 figures. In 2002 Ontario Hydro’s
liabilities amounted to $38.1 billion. This figure includes the
cost of decommissioning nuclear power stations and disposing of
atomic waste. Ontario Hydro’s successor companies share responsibility
for $17.2 billion of this total, and $13.1 billion will be covered
by “dedicated revenue streams,” i.e., energy taxes.
The remaining $7.8 billion is considered stranded debt and is being
managed by one of the successor companies: the Ontario Electricity
Financial Corporation (OEFC).
3. On April 1, 1999, Ontario Hydro was divided
into five successor companies. On May 1, 2002, the industry was
deregulated. Two of the five successor companies (Ontario Power
Generation Inc. and Hydro One) are private companies, another two
(the Independent Electricity Market Operator and the Electrical
Safety Authority) are not-for-profit organizations, and one (Ontario
Electricity Financial Corporation) is a Crown Corporation.
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